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Abstract
We introduce an end-to-end private deep learning framework, applied to the task
of predicting 30-day readmission from electronic health records. By using differ-
ential privacy during training and homomorphic encryption during inference, we
demonstrate that our proposed pipeline could maintain high performance while
providing robust privacy guarantees against information leak from data transmis-
sion or attacks against the model. We also explore several techniques to address
the privacy-utility trade-off in deploying neural networks with privacy mechanisms,
improving the accuracy of differentially-private training and the computation cost
of encrypted operations using ideas from both machine learning and cryptography.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been applied to a variety of clinical tasks to great success. Medical
imaging diagnosis [23], genome processing [31], and disease onset predictions [27] are domains
where deep learning could help uncover patterns in data and greatly improve quality of care and
treatment. Unfortunately, since medical data is also extremely privacy-sensitive, the healthcare
industry is subject to stringent patient protection regulations such as HIPAA and GINA, impeding the
widespread adoption of data mining techniques in the medical community [3].
Without addressing these privacy concerns, it is unlikely that machine learning as a service (MLaaS)
platforms will be adopted by the healthcare community due to the risk of information leakage during
data transmission or to cloud providers [4]. Anonymized data is vulnerable to de-anonymization
attacks, as shown in the Netflix deanonymization demonstration [30], and thus is not an adequate
solution for data sharing in the healthcare domain [24]. The alternative scheme of deploying only the
trained models is also insufficient, as recent works [38, 10] have demonstrated how neural networks
could memorize training data even when they are not overfitting. Attacks like membership inference
[35] and model inversion [18] can reveal population information or recover training inputs from a
neural network, in some cases with only black-box access to the model.
Machine-learning services that are private and secure by design will allow healthcare practitioners
to benefit from advances in deep learning. In this work, we explore separate constructs for private
and secure machine learning that are compatible, using differential privacy during training [2] and
homomorphic encryption for inference [21], in order to provide a fully-private pipeline. In addition
to our work being the first to combine and apply these techniques to realistic clinical tasks, we also
propose several guidelines to improve the accuracy and computational performance. In particular,
we demonstrate the importance of standardizing EHR data to enhance differentially private learning
in terms of privacy costs and training stability. We also use state-of-the-art techniques to improve
network performance and computational overhead through parameterized activation functions with
coefficients quantized to leverage sparse polynomial multiplication.
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Figure 1: The healthcare provider trains a neural network using differential privacy and hosts the
encrypted model on a third-party host, allowing end users to send and receive encrypted data.
2 Related Work
Differential privacy is a privacy construct which guarantees that an individual will not change the
overall statistics of the population [16], a formal definition defined as algorithm M and dataset D
being (, δ) private if P (M(x ∈ D) ∈ S) ≤ eP (M(x ∈ D′) ∈ S) + δ. Applying differential
privacy to neural networks helps ensure defenses against membership inference and model inversion
attacks [2]. This can be achieved by either applying noise to gradients while training a single model
[1, 36] or by segregating data and adding noise in a collaborative learning setting [32, 34].
Gentry et. al. [20] introduced fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) which allows anyone to perform
computation over encrypted data without having to decrypt it. A weaker version of FHE, called
leveled homomorphic encryption (LHE) permits a subset of arithmetic operations on a depth-bounded
arithmetic circuit [8]. CryptoNets [21] was one of the first works to apply LHE to a neural network
setting. More recently, [11] and [26] extended this technique to deeper network architectures and
developed low-degree polynomial approximations to common activation functions (i.e. ReLU,
Sigmoid), in addition to leveraging batch normalization for stability.
Several previous works have attempted to apply privacy techniques to the healthcare setting. [7] uses
homomorphic encryption to encrypt a linear regression model trained on medical databases. A good
deal of literature also studies the use of differential privacy (DP) in medicine [33, 15, 14], although
the focus is mainly on applying DP to the datasets rather than the ML algorithm.
3 Methods
3.1 Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD)
DP-SGD optimization was developed by [1] and involves adding Gaussian noise and clipping
gradients of neural networks during training with stochastic gradient descent. It also keeps track of
the privacy loss through a privacy accountant [29], which prematurely terminates training when the
total privacy cost of accessing training data exceeds a predetermined budget. Differential privacy is
attained as clipping bounds the L2-norm of individual gradients, thus limiting the influence of each
example on the learning updates. An outline of DP-SGD algorithm is included in the appendix.
Through standardization, we scale and translate each feature such that its values lie between 0 and
1. As seen from Table 4.2, this greatly reduces the L2 norm of the gradients, and equivalently,
the clipping bound and the amount of noise required for privacy guarantees. We also observe that
standardization improves both AUC and recall, which are especially important given the scarcity of
positive labels.
3.2 CryptoNets - Inference on Encrypted Data
We use a levelled HE-scheme with a pretrained network as outlined in [21] to support inference for
encrypted input. We use the FV-RNS scheme proposed by [5]. This is a residue number system (RNS)
variant of the FV encryption scheme [17] and is implemented in SEAL, a library for homomorphic
encryption [12]. We use a ring dimension n = 8192 with two plaintext moduli t(j). Each coefficient
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DP noise injected Standardization Median L2-Norm Accuracy AUC Recall
No No 50.6 0.802 0.659 0.313
No Yes 2.34 0.610 0.677 0.642
Yes No N/A 0.765 0.615 0.356
Yes Yes N/A 0.588 0.638 0.662
Table 1: Effects of input standardization and DP training (with small noise  = 8) on different metrics.
L2-Norm is much smaller with standardization (results not included for DP-noise due to clipping).
We find that overall DP does not hurt the AUC much and even improves the recall of our experiments.
modulus q(j) is decomposed into four 64-bit moduli for efficient use of FV-RNS. Further details of
the encryption operation are placed in the appendix in the interest of space.
Neural networks mostly consist of HE compatible multiplicative and additive operations, with the
exception of non-linear activation functions which the original CryptoNets paper [21] substitutes with
a square activation. However, the activation function of a neural network is critical for convergence
[22], and it has been shown that polynomial approximations of activation functions retain much of
the performance as their nonlinear counterparts [19, 28]. We polynomially approximate the Swish
activation using a Minimax function (details provided in appendix), giving us a polynomial equation
p = 0.12050344x2 + 0.5x + 0.153613744. Due to the extra multiplicative operations which are
expensive in HE schemes, using more complex polynomial functions requires more computational
power. However, while a brute-force implementation would require O(n2) time to complete, HE
methods are able to accomplish this in O(n log n) when a coefficient modulus q is chosen such that
(q − 1) is divisible by 2n, by the Number Theoretic Transform [25]. Thus, we use the activation
p∗ = 2−3x2 + 2−1x+ 2−4 which helps lower the computational cost of our chosen activation layer.
4 Experiments
4.1 Dataset and Model
Our dataset [37] is obtained from the UCI Machine Learning Repository and contains 10 years (1999-
2008) of medical records of more than 101,000 patients from 130 US hospitals. The data consists
of demographics and clinical metrics associated with risk of diabetes, in addition to readmission
outcome. Features with about 40% missing values such as medical speciality, payer code and weight
are removed from our analysis. We aggregated ICD9 codes that represent similar diagnoses into
10 groups, and converted any categorical feature into one-hot encoding representation. Then we
randomly split the dataset into train and test sets with the ratio of 75:25. Our goal is to predict whether
a diabetic patient would be readmitted within 30 days after being discharged. Being a key indicator
of quality of care, this task has been widely studied in existing literature, and for this dataset, by
other works such as [13] and [6]. Our network consists of one hidden layer of size 32 and one output
layer, each is followed by an approximated quantized swish activation function. We also use a mean
squared error weighted by the class imbalance ratio (8:1). The model was trained with batch size of
256 and Adam optimizer on an Intel Core i7-5930K CPU at 3.50GHz with 48GB RAM.
4.2 Prediction performance
We fix to δ = 10−5 by estimating δ = 1/n where n = 100, 000 rows, and clipping bound = 1.0
using the l2-norm estimation. We report test accuracy, area under Receiver Operating Characteristic
curve (AUC) and recall of our model’s predictions on test dataset, with more emphasis on the last
2 metrics due to the imbalanced nature of the training data. AUC measures the discrimination at
different classification thresholds, while high recall is necessary as we consider the cost of misses
(i.e. discharging patients when they are not ready) to be more serious that that of false alarms. In
fact, we find high accuracy to often be correlated with poor performance, as it is trivial to get ∼90%
accuracy by guessing one class. From Table 4.2, the standard training of our HE-compatible model
(with polynomial activations) gives better performance (AUC= 0.67) than the baselines obtained
from normal neural networks in [13] (AUC = 0.61) and [6] (AUC = 0.23). Even with large amount
of noise injected (eps=1.0 in Figure 2), our fully private network still yields a higher AUC of 0.63,
compared to the aforementioned existing works on this dataset. We found that with δ = 10−5, the
best performance is achieved by injecting a moderate level of noise ( = 4).
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Figure 2: Left: AUC over time for different noise levels. We note that the budget δ = 1e− 5 is spent
faster for smaller noise (i.e. larger eps) leading to early termination. Right : AUC of different (, δ)
values on test set. Both plots show that the best AUC is achieved with a moderate noise level: when
 = 4, we obtain AUC = 0.66, recall = 0.60
4.3 Comparison of Activation Functions
Before approximated swish activation, we also experimented with other functions, both low-degree
polynomial (square activation) and non-linear (ReLU and Sigmoid). Test results from training our
network with each function combination with no differential private noise are shown in Table 4.3,
with confidence level obtained from 10 repeated trials. We observe that square activations produce
more instability in performance and high variance across different runs. For approximated swish
activations, the AUC is fairly stable and even surpasses the performance of non-linear activations.
Activations Accuracy AUC Recall
Square×2 0.650 ± 0.141 0.654 ± 0.014 0.552 ± 0.167
ReLU-Sigmoid 0.633 ± 0.125 0.668 ± 0.003 0.596 ± 0.163
Approximated Swish×2 0.618 ± 0.153 0.678 ± 0.003 0.645 ± 0.181
Table 2: Accuracy of Activation Functions. We see that the square activation produces the lowest AU
and recall. We also find the approximated swish function produces higher AUC and recall values
than the nonlinear ReLU-Sigmoid activations.
Activations Wallclock Runtime (s) Multiplicative Operations
Square 21.700657 6780
Approx. Swish (without quantization) 21.900602 6912
Approx. Swish (with quantization) 21.797248 6912
Table 3: Computational Costs of Activation Functions: We can see that the non-quantized swish has
longer runtime due to the higher amount of multiplicative operations, and also that the quantized
swish approximation reduces the runtime without reducing the number of operations.
Homomorphic encryption is computationally expensive, raising the runtime of neural network infer-
ences from an order of milliseconds to ≈20 seconds. We can see in Table 4.3 that the approximated
swish function without quantization adds additional runtime due to the extra multiplicative operations,
but with quantization, the increased costs become negligible. With larger networks that contain more
activations and multiplicative operations, this time saving will be even more pronounced.
5 Conclusion
For deep learning to be widely adopted in the healthcare community, the privacy and security of
patient data will have to be ensured at every step of deployment. We utilized differentially private
learning and homomorphic encryption to protect privacy at both the training and inference stages,
and demonstrated the deployment of our framework on a representative clinical prediction task. We
also discussed several techniques to minimize the training instability and computational trade-off
incurred by those privacy measures. We hope this work will inspire future efforts to build machine
learning systems that prioritizes patient privacy by design.
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Appendix
A Differentially Private Gradient Optimization
Algorithm 1: Differentially private SGD
input : Examples {x1, ..., xN}, loss function L(θ) = 1NΣiL(θ, xi), Parameters: learning rate ηt,
noise scale σ, group size L, gradient norm bound C.
output :θT and calculate privacy cost (, δ) using a privacy accountant method
1 Initialize θ0 randomly;
2 for t ∈ [T ] do
3 Take a random sample Lt with sampling probability L/N ;
4 Compute gradient;
5 For each i ∈ Lt, compute gt(xi)← ∇θtL(θt, xi);
6 Clip gradient;
7 gt(xi)← gt(xi)/max(1, ‖gt(xi)‖2C ;
8 Add noise;
9 g˜t ← 1L (Σi(gt(xi) +N (0, σ2C2I)));
10 Descent;
11 θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜t;
B Levelled Homomorphic Encryption
The levelled homomorphic encryption scheme is a structure-preserving transformation between two
algebraic structures, which can be leveraged by cryptosystems to allow for arithmetic operations on
encrypted data. Let Rk denote the polynomial ring Zk[x]/(xn + 1). We let x← S denote uniformly
random sampling of x from an arbitrary set S, and b tqpe denote a coefficient-wise division and
rounding of the polynomial p with respect to integer moduli t and q. Let [p]q denote the reduction of
the coefficients of the polynomial p modulo q, and let ∆ denote bq/tc.
Encryption Scheme. Bajard et al. [5] proposed an encryption scheme, FV-RNS, which is a residue
number system (RNS) variant of the FV encryption scheme. In FV-RNS, plaintexts are elements
of the polynomial ring Rt, where t is the plaintext modulus and n is the maximum degree of the
polynomial, which is commonly selected to be one of {1024, 2048, 4096, 8192, 16384, 32768}. The
plaintext elements are mapped to multiple ciphertexts in Rq in the encryption scheme, with q  t
as the ciphertext coefficient modulus. For any logarithm base β, let ` = blogβ qc be the number of
terms in the base-β decomposition of polynomials in Rq that is used for relinearization.
Let χ denote the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution. The secret key is generated as s ← R3
with coefficients si ∈ {0, 1,−1}. The public key (p0, p1) is generated by sampling p0 ← Rq and
e′ ← χ and constructing p1 = [−(sp0+e′)]q . The evaluation keys (ai, gi) are generated by sampling
ai ← Rq and constructing gi = [−(ais+ ie′) + βis2]q for each i ∈ {0, ..., `}.
A plaintextm ∈ Rt is encrypted by sampling u← R3 with coefficients ui ∈ {0, 1,−1} and e1, e2 ←
χ, and letting (c0, c1) = ([bq/tcm+ p0u+ e1]q, [p1u+ e1]q). A ciphertext (c0, c1) ∈ Rq × Rq is
decrypted as m = [b tq [c0 + c1s]qe]t ∈ Rt.
Arithmetic. The addition of two ciphertexts (c0, c1) and (d0, d1) is (c0 + d0, c1 + d1). The multipli-
cation of two ciphertexts (c0, c1) and (d0, d1) occurs by constructing
c′0 =
[⌊
t
q
[c0d0]
⌉]
q
, c′1 =
[⌊
t
q
[c0d1 + c1d0]
⌉]
q
, and c′2 =
[⌊
t
q
[c1d1]
⌉]
q
.
We express c′2 in base β as c
′
2 =
∑`
i=0 c
′(i)
2 β
i. We then let r0 = c′0 +
∑`
i=0 aic
′(i)
2 and r1 =
c′1 +
∑`
i=0 gic
′(i)
2 , which forms the product ciphertext (r0, r1) ∈ Rq ×Rq .
The addition of ciphertext (c0, c1) and plaintextm is the ciphertext (c0+∆m, c1). The multiplication
of ciphertext (c0, c1) and plaintext m is the ciphertext (mc0,mc1).
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The advantage of the residue number system variant is that the coefficient modulus q can be decom-
posed into several small moduli q1, ..., qk to avoid multiple-precision operations on the polynomial
coefficients in the homomorphic operations, which improves the efficiency of evaluation.
Integer Encoder. To encode real numbers involved in the computation, we choose a fixed precision
for the values (15 bits) and scale each value by the corresponding power of 2 to get an integer for use
with the encoder described below. After decryption, we can divide by the accumulated scaling factor
to obtain a real value for the prediction. The encoder consists of a base-2 integer encoder [12]. For a
given integer z, consider the binary expansion of |z| = zn−1...z1z0. The the coefficients bi of the
polynomial f(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 bix
i in the plaintext ring are zi if zi ≥ 0 otherwise bi = t− zi.
Polynomials Let x ∈ R and let f : R→ R denote the activation function. Our task is to approximate
f with a polynomial p∗ : R → R where p∗(x) = p∗0 + p∗1x + · · ·+ p∗nxn subject to the constraint
that each coefficient is a power of 2. Define P(2)n as the set of all polynomials of degree less than or
equal to n, such that all coefficients are base-2. That is, P(2)n = {2a0 + 2a1x+ · · ·+ 2anxn, ai ∈ Z}.
Let p be the minimax approximation to f on some interval [−a, a]. Let pˆ be the same as p, but with
all coefficients rounded to the nearest 2k where k ∈ Z. Note, pˆ ∈ P(2)n .
Maximum Error & Minimax The maximum difference (i.e., error) δ between two functions g and
h is δ(g, h) = maxx∈[−a,a] |g(x)− h(x)|. This provides a strong bound on the optimal polynomial
approximation error δ(f, p∗) where δ(f, p) ≤ δ(f, p∗) ≤ δ(f, pˆ). We state minimax problem as
follows. For a given activation function f , we seek to find the best polynomial p∗ ∈ P(2)n such that,
δ(f, p∗) = min
q∈P(2)n
δ(f, q) (1)
subject to the constraint,
δ(f, p∗) ≤ K where K ≥ δ(f, p). (2)
Finite Number of Solutions. Let d, n ∈ N, and D = {0, ..., d}. For ∀i ∈ D, let xi, li, ui ∈ R such
that xj 6= xk if j 6= k. We can construct a bounded polyhedron,
B =
(α0, ..., αn) ∈ Rn+1
∣∣∣∣∣ li ≤
n∑
j=0
αjx
j
i ≤ ui,∀i ∈ D

where each (α0, ..., αn) tuple represents any polynomial q ∈ P(2)n , and where αi represents the
degree i coefficient. [9] show that the number of polynomials satisfying Equation 2 is finite if the
polynomials are contained in B. They also proposed an efficient scanning method to find the optimal
polynomial approximation p∗. Equipped with our new-found approximation p∗, we can evaluate the
effectiveness of p∗ as an activation function in both non-encrypted and encrypted domains.
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